international fugitives, are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 31847 and, with limited exception, by treaty. 8 Typically, the process is triggered when the Department of State receives a request from a foreign country. 9 Because the preparation of a formal request for extradition is time-consuming and a fugitive is likely to flee if he learns of it, most treaties provide for the provisional arrest of fugitives while the request is being perfected.1 0 The Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs reviews the request for a provisional arrest warrant and, if sufficient, sends it to the U.S. Attorney for the district where the person sought Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) . See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § § 474-75 (1987) ("Extradition is the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a crime under the law of one state is arrested in another state and returned for trial or punishment.").
6. committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by treaty or convention], that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate [judge] , to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2006) . See United States v. Liu Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 1997 ) ("In the United States, the procedures for extradition are governed by statute.").
8. See In re Extradition of Lahoria, 932 F. Supp. 802, 805 (N.D. Tex. 1996 ) ("International extradition proceedings are governed both by statute ... and by treaty."). Comity allows for the return of third country nationals (persons who are not citizens, nationals, or residents of the United States), absent a treaty, provided certain conditions are satisfied. 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) (2006) . See Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 1975 ) ("International extradition is governed only by considerations of comity and treaty provisions."). See generally Hall, supra note 1, at 601 ('Treaties and federal statutes govern the extradition process.") (footnotes omitted).
9. See Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Extradition is ordinarily initiated by a request from the foreign state to the Department of State.").
10. See Duran v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 622, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1999 ) ("In order to avoid the flight of a defendant during preparation of a full formal request, many extradition treaties permit a provisional arrest to be made upon receipt of an informal request."). See also MATTERS § 9-15.230 (1997) ,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATrORNEY'S MANUAL, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADmON AND RELATED
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usanltitle9/15mcrm.htm ("Because the time involved in preparing a formal request can be lengthy, most treaties allow for the provisional arrest of fugitives in urgent cases." ); Nathaniel A. Persily, Note, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 407, 415 (1988) ("Provisional arrest is usually justified as necessary to capture a fugitive who presents a high risk of flight, until such time as the country formally requests extradition.").
[Vol. 17:1 FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF BAIL to be extradited is located." The U.S. Attorney then files a complaint in support of an arrest warrant before a federal judge or magistrate.' 2 After apprehension of the fugitive, the requesting state, through a formal request, provides the U.S. government with the additional information required to carry out the extradition under the treaty.' 3 This ultimately leads to the extradition hearing.1 4 If, at the conclusion of that hearing, the judicial officer "deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge" 15 -which in international extradition hearings means probable cause' 6 -then he must certify the same to the Secretary of State, who will review the case and determine whether to issue a warrant for the surrender of the person sought to be extradited. 1 7 If the 11. See U.S. ATrORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-15.700 (explaining how OIA will review request for sufficiency and then forward it to appropriate district).
12. 'L L. 729, 752 (1998) ("[M] ost extradition laws and treaties provide that the alleged fugitive may be arrested and temporarily detained for a period of time to enable the requesting State to furnish the necessary documentation in support of its request for his extradition.").
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (noting that the purpose of apprehension after issuance of a warrant is so that person "may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate [judge] , to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered.").
15. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 198 (1980) ("The requesting country bears the burden of establishing probable cause to believe that the accused committed the charged offense.") (footnote omitted).
17. 1100 , 1103 (2d Cir. 1996 ("[T] he Secretary of State has final authority to extradite the fugitive, but is not required to do so. Pursuant to its authority to conduct foreign affairs, the Executive Branch retains plenary discretion to refuse extradition.").
The prevailing view is that the Secretary of State will seldom reject an extradition request
2007]
extraditee is not surrendered to the requesting country within two months of the commitment order, he may, absent "sufficient cause," be released.' While there is no direct appeal from the magistrate or judge's extradition ruling, 311, 312 (1925) . Accord Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199 , 1205 (9th Cir. 1999 Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997 Cir. 1990 ) ( "[The extradition hearing is] essentially a 'preliminary examination to determine whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the accused and his surrender to the demanding nation."') (citation omitted).
27. In re Extradition of Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395 , 1399 (9th Cir. 1986 ) (citation omitted); In re Extradition of Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208 , 1219 (S.D. Cal. 1997 ) (judicial officer presiding over the extradition hearing "has wide latitude in admitting evidence") (citation omitted).
28. See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he rules of evidence and civil procedure that govern federal court proceedings heard under the authority of Article Im of the United States Constitution do not apply in extradition hearings that are conducted under the authority of a treaty enacted pursuant to Article II."); FED. R. CriM. P. 54(b)(5) ("These rules are not applicable to extradition or rendition .... ).
29. See Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 175 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[I] n an extradition proceeding, discovery is not only discretionary with the court, it is narrow in scope."); Montemayor Seguy v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (S.D. Tex. 2004 ) ("The extradition law, the extradition treaty, and the United States Constitution do not require production of exculpatory evidence at an extradition hearing."). But see Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353-54 (6th Cir. 1993 ) (recognizing that government must provide exculpatory evidence where it has conducted its own investigation of the offense underlying the extradition request and uncovered exculpatory information); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41 (9th Cir. 1986 ) ("Although there is no explicit statutory basis for ordering discovery in
to cross-examine witnesses at an extradition hearing, 3° where the evidence may consist of hearsay, 31 and credibility determinations are the province of the extraditing judicial officer. 32 Additionally, § 3190 permits the demanding country to introduce properly authenticated evidence gathered at home.
33
The defenses available at an extradition hearing are limited; for example, "evidence of alibi or of facts contradicting the demanding country's proof of a defense such as insanity may properly be excluded., 34 Certified proof of a foreign conviction upon which the extradition request is based 35 and extradition hearings ... the extradition magistrate has the right, under the court's inherent power, to order such discovery procedures as law and justice require.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984 ) ("As in the case of a grand jury proceeding, a defendant has no right to cross-examine witnesses or introduce evidence to rebut that of the prosecutor.").
31 32. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 815 ("The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is solely within the province of the extraditing magistrate.").
33. § 3190, captioned "Evidence on hearing," states: Depositions, warrants or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence upon the hearing of any extradition case shall be received and admitted as evidence on such hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country shall be proof that the same, so offered, are authenticated in the manner required. 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (2006 See Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[A] foreign conviction obtained after a trial at which the accused is present is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause for the purposes of extradition."); Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[A] certified copy of a foreign conviction, obtained following a trial at which the defendant was present, is sufficient to sustain a judicial officer's determination that probable cause exists to extradite."); United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Vt. 1979) ("[T] he certified copy of respondent's Certificate of Conviction in Canada... is sufficient proof that probable cause exists that the respondent has been guilty of an offense involving criminality and we hold that document satisfies the requirement that the court find sufficient 'evidence of criminality."').
[Vol. 17:1 FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF BAIL accomplice testimony 36 are sufficient to establish probable cause. A certificate of extradition ultimately will issue if the judge or magistrate has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person sought to be extradited, the offense for which extradition was sought was an extraditable offense under a treaty in effect at the time of the request, and competent evidence is presented sufficient to establish probable cause that the extraditee 37 committed the alleged offense.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
As noted previously, although there is no statutory right to bail in international extradition proceedings, 3 9 in Wright v. Henkel 4 the Supreme Court recognized that if "special circumstances" are present, bail is available to those facing extradition to a foreign country. 41 This acknowledgment spawned the development of a federal common law on the question of bail involving foreign extradition. 42 We now turn to a discussion of the development of that Supp. 777, 782-84 (N.D. Cal. 1985 was inconsistent with admission to bail after a finding of extraditability; at that point, the statute only called for the commissioner or judge to "issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the properjail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made., 47 In this vein, the Court noted that at the point at which the country demanding extradition performed its obligations under the treaty and the law, it was "entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government [wa]s under obligation to make the surrender; an obligation which it might be impossible to fulfill if release on bail were permitted. ' ai The Court found that this rationale also appeared "generally applicable to release pending examination." 49 Below, the Second Circuit had ruled that, in the absence of a statute, circuit courts lacked the power to grant bail in foreign extradition proceedings. 5° While affirming the ruling denying Wright's request for bail, the Supreme Court declined to hold that federal courts had "no power in respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically vested by statute, or that, while bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not in any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief."'"
B. Early Cases
The first reported opinion applying Wright was In re Mitchell. 5 2 That case involved a petitioner arrested for fraud under the extradition treaty with Canada. 53 The arrest warrant was issued on the eve of a civil trial involving petitioner's fortune. 4 Judge Learned Hand determined that while courts had the power under Wright to grant bail in cases involving foreign extradition, that power "should be exercised only in the most pressing circumstances, and when the requirements of justice [we]re absolutely peremptory." 55 In the case of In re Mitchell, Judge Hand found special circumstances warranted release on bail because of Mitchell's need to engage in "free consultation in the conduct of the civil suit upon which his whole fortune depend [ed] ," and the fact that he knew changed the term "commissioner" to "magistrate" in section 3184. about the extradition request for some time but had not fled.
56
Twenty-five years following In re Mitchell, there appear to be only three reported cases addressing the question of bail in foreign extradition proceedings, in more than a passing manner. 57 In two of these cases, the courts 58 denied bail. One held the lapse of "several weeks" between the time of arrest and the hearing, and the "discomfort" associated with jail during that period did not present "unusual circumstances" so as to warrant the grant of bail. 59 In the remaining case, which involved a petitioner arrested in Pennsylvania and charged with obtaining money under false pretenses in Canada, the court initially noted that bail for the offense was available under both Canadian and Pennsylvania law. 6° Balancing "the small risk of default" against "the injustice of imposing imprisonment in advance of a hearing," which was scheduled no earlier than two months later, the court granted petitioner bail.
6 '
C. Development of the Special Circumstances Test in Federal Common Law
As foreign extradition requests increased through the years, so did the number of reported district court opinions from magistrates and judges, as well as circuit court decisions, regarding the issue of bail in international extradition matters. In most cases, the requests arose prior to the extradition hearing, either after arrest following the filing of the formal extradition request, 62 or pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant. 63 In some cases, the request for bail arose after 56. Id. at 290. Judge Hand further held that upon termination of the civil case, petitioner was to be returned to prison to await resolution of the extradition proceeding. Id. Should the prisoner default, he will not only forfeit the penal sum of his bond, but will inflict upon himself a punishment many times heavier than any which would follow conviction for the offense with which he is charged, for he must thereafter elude the vigilance of the officers of each and both of two governments whose resources are practically unlimited. Supp. 362, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1990 ). See also Hills, 765 F. Supp. at 385 ("This 'special circumstances' test applies to requests for release on bail both before and after an extradition hearing; it also applies to requests for release on bond, made after only a 'provisional' arrest pending the extraditing country's submission of formal extradition documents."). See Persily, supra note 10, at 414 ("A fugitive facing extradition petitions for bail at every opportunity: from the moment of arrest, to the hearing on extraditability, continuing to the final appeal for habeas relief, and not ceasing until the instant the fugitive is taken to the requesting country to face trial.").
See In re

As the Court explained in Wright:
The demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender; an obligation which it might be impossible to fulfill if release on bail were permitted. The enforcement of the bond, if forfeited, would hardly meet the international demand; and the regaining of the custody of the accused obviously would be surrounded with serious embarrassment. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62 (1903 
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Lastly, the petitioner has the burden to establish special circumstances warranting his admission to bail. 6 9 With these considerations in place, we now turn to the factors which courts have evaluated in ascertaining whether special circumstances supporting admission to bail in an international extradition proceeding existed.
Courts have recognized that the following factors, either individually or in unison with one or more other factors, 70 may constitute "special circumstances" so as to support admitting a putative extraditee to bail: (i) a substantial likelihood of success at the hearing; 7 1 (ii) availability of bail for the underlying charge in the requesting country; 72 (iii) the requesting country's allowance of admission to bail for those facing an extradition hearing for the same offense; 73 (iv) the likelihood of success in defending against the action in the requesting country; 74 (v) a delayed extradition hearing; 75 (vi) a severe health [Petitioner] contends that because he is not a flight risk, he is entitled to bail pending the appeal of the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. That is not the criteria for release in an extradition hearing.") (citation omitted).
Some courts reason that "risk of flight is more in the nature of a condition precedent to going forward with any determination of the existence of 'special circumstances' that could overcome the presumption against bail. Cal. 1990 ). Other courts have found that "the best approach first explores special circumstances, and then, only after a finding of special circumstances examines risk of flight." Nacif-Borge, 829 F. Supp 79 (ii) the pendency of naturalization proceedings; 80 (iii) the desire to take the dental board examination; 81 (iv) providing service as a medical doctor; 8 2 (v) the discomfort of jail; 83 (vi) political status;84 (vii) the need for a special diet on account of having only one kidney and associated health concerns; 8 5 (viii) an offer to compromise the underlying charge in the requesting country; 86 (ix) the need to consult with counsel about the extradition proceeding; 8 7 (x) pending civil or criminal litigation (whether or not related to the extradition proceeding); 88 (xi) availability of electronic monitoring; 89 and (xii) the failure of the requesting country to provide the putative extraditee with credit on his or her sentence for time served in American custody.
90
D. A Bump on the Road
The federal common law regarding bail in foreign extradition matters evolved within the framework of the special circumstances test discussed above until the Ninth Circuit decided Parretti v. United States. 9 1 In Parretti, the court held, in part, that Parretti's detention without bail before his extradition hearing, after the district court had determined that he did not pose a risk of flight, violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment.
92
Although that opinion subsequently was withdrawn by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc when it applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the panel's treatment and analysis of the bail issue may influence the decisions of judges or magistrates in the future on this question, and thus, merits discussion here. 93 In Parretti, the circuit court began its discussion by recognizing that the district court had not abused its discretion when it determined that petitioner 90. See In re Extradition of Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 863 (9th Cir. 1986 ). 91. 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997 , appeal dismissed on other grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 877 (1998) . An earlier version of the Parretti opinion is found at 112 F.3d 1363 112 F.3d (9th Cir. 1997 92. Parretti, 122 F.3d at 781. In Parretti, petitioner, an Italian citizen, was arrested pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant under the extradition treaty between the United States and France. Id. at 761. The warrant was based on the complaint of an Assistant U.S. Attorney acting on behalf of the French government. Id. The complaint alleged that petitioner had been charged in an arrest warrant issued in France with various business-related crimes, that the crimes were extraditable offenses under the treaty, and that France had requested petitioner's provisional arrest. Id.
Following his arrest, petitioner argued at his bail hearing and his habeas petition that the provisional warrant violated the Fourth Amendment on two grounds. First, it was not based on any evidence that he had committed any of the offenses with which he had been charged in the French warrant. Id. Secondly, petitioner maintained that the magistrate judge had failed to make a probable cause determination. Id. at 762. The district court denied the petition and, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the government had failed to make the necessary evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe that petitioner had committed an extraditable crime. Id. at 766. The court also ruled that detention without bail violated petitioner's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. had not established special circumstances warranting his admission to bail. 94 But that was not the end of the inquiry, for Parretti argued that even if special circumstances were not present, denying him admission to bail, absent a finding of risk of flight or danger to the community, violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. 95 In responding to this argument, the court preliminarily noted that Wright and its progeny had not foreclosed the due process argument that Parretti presented. 96 It then turned to the heart of the government's contention --that "its interest in fulfilling [its] obligations under extradition treaties [wa]s sufficiently compelling to justify pre-hearing detention regardless of how slight the risk that the detainee will jump bail and make it impossible to deliver him to the requesting government." 97 The court found that the interest, while weighty, was not "materially different from and greater than [the government's] interest in the enforcement of our own criminal laws." 98 In that regard, the only governmental interest generally deemed sufficient to justify pre-hearing detention absent risk of flight was protection of community safety. 99 But the government had not presented a public safety argument, and the court rejected the contention that a comparable interest could be found "in avoiding the risk of being unable to carry out its treaty obligations, however attenuated that risk may be."' ° In its ruling, the court made clear that it was addressing the issue of bail prior to a finding of extraditability.°1 0 94. Parretti, 122 F.3d at 777. Parretti had argued that the following four special circumstances warranted his admission to bail: (i) he was likely to succeed at the extradition hearing; (ii) his detention interfered with his ability to participate in civil suits in which he was engaged; (iii) his detention impacted his health; and (iv) France had not sought his extradition while he was in Italy. Id. 95. Id. 96 . Id. at 778 ("[Tjhe government contends that it cannot be presumed that this court's and the Supreme Court's earlier decisions ignored due process concerns in adopting and applying the 'special circumstances' standard .... Not surprisingly, the government cites no authority in support of this startling proposition.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. 98. Id. at 779. The court observed:
In the last analysis, the purpose of extradition treaties is to strengthen our hand in enforcing our laws through the cooperation of other countries in apprehending fugitives. Yet the government implicitly argues that the law enforcement interest served by extradition treaties is somehow different from and greater than its interest in enforcing our domestic laws. The government fails to suggest any difference, and we can fathom none.
Id.
99. Id. 100. Id. at 780 (footnote omitted). 101. Id. ("Our holding is a limited one: until such time as an individual is found to be extraditable, his or her Fifth Amendment liberty interest trumps the government's treaty interest unless the government proves to the satisfaction of the district court that he or she is a flight risk.") See In re Extradition of Campillo Valles, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1228 , 1229 (S.D. Cal. 1998 (applying Parretti and holding that petitioner was not entitled to bail because he posed a risk of flight and was a danger to the community).
Since the Ninth Circuit's withdrawal of the panel decision in Parretti, there have been several opinions from magistrates granting bail in international extradition proceedings.' 02 In those cases, special circumstances were found to be present; therefore, there was no need to consider whether, absent the presence of such circumstances and a risk of flight, it would have been a violation of due process not to admit petitioners to bail. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the due process argument employed by the panel in Parretti has been, and will continue to be, made by putative extraditees in international extradition proceedings. In evaluating a due process challenge, at least two points must be considered. First, in Wright, the petitioner maintained that denial of access to bail "constitute[d] a deprivation of liberty without due process of law."' 0 4 Therefore, an argument can be made that the Court at least implicitly rejected that contention when it upheld the denial of the bail application. 1 0 5 Second, detention in international extradition proceedings is not intended to be punitive;' "6 rather, it is designed to protect the government's weighty interests in fulfilling its treaty obligations. 106. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) ( "Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it.]') (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-69 (1963) When a requesting nation has followed the procedures prescribed by an extradition treaty and the accused is found to be extraditable, the United States has a substantial interest in surrendering him in compliance with the treaty. First, the United States has a clear interest in ridding itself of foreign criminals, especially since extradition is normally used only for those charged with, or convicted of, serious, often violent, crimes. Without a reliable extradition practice, the United States would risk becoming a haven for such dangerous international fugitives.
Perhaps a more important reason for the United States to extradite in compliance with its extradition treaties is the likely reciprocal consequences of noncompliance. If the United States fails to deliver a bona fide extraditee, it will breach its obligation under international law. In response, the aggrieved nation 
E. Judicial Review of Bail Determinations
As noted earlier, an extraditee can seek review of a ruling certifying his extraditability through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.'
0 8 But what about bail determination? Is the denial of bail appealable? If so, can the government also appeal the grant of bail?
Putative extraditees denied bail by a magistrate have obtained review before a district court judge by way of appeal, 1 0 9 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 10 or through a motion seeking reconsideration of the original bail application."' Some courts have held that the standard for review is whether there were reasonable grounds for the magistrate's denial of bail.
12 Other courts have observed that the magistrate's decision is subject to de novo review.
13 Extraditees also have appealed a district court's denial of a request for admission to bail to the circuit court.' appeal,' 16 or by a motion for reconsideration of the magistrate's order. 1 7 At the appellate level, without discussing the source of their jurisdiction, circuit courts consistently have entertained appeals by the government from a district court's order admitting an extraditee to bail." 8 The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a district court's decision to grant bail to a putative extraditee is a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which the government may appeal. 1 9 V. CONCLUSION Generally speaking, under the Bail Reform Act, which governs conditions of release for those accused of domestic crimes, a defendant will be released on bail unless the judge determines that he poses a risk of flight or danger to the community. If a defendant poses such a risk or danger, he will still be entitled to release, if there are conditions that can ameliorate those concerns.
2
An international extradition proceeding, however, is not considered a criminal prosecution. As the cases make clear, "[t]he rationale for not ordinarily granting bail in extradition cases is that extradition cases involve an overriding national interest in complying with treaty obligations.'
22
The developing case law reveals that although putative extraditees have been admitted to bail, 23 the presumption against bail in international extradition
